Statistical Discrimination and Affirmative Action in the Lab*

Ahrash Dianat  
University of Essex  
a.dianat@essex.ac.uk

Federico Echenique  
Caltech  
fede@caltech.edu

Leeat Yariv  
Princeton University  
lyariv@princeton.edu

October 21, 2021

Abstract

We present results from laboratory experiments studying statistical discrimination and affirmative action. We induce statistical discrimination in simple labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy that firms receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-action policies have nearly the same effect, and practically eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stickiness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the observed outcomes.

JEL Classifications: J71, D04, C91
Keywords: Statistical Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Experiments

*We thank Richard Sander for very helpful comments as well as the Editor Gary Charness, an anonymous Associate Editor, and two anonymous reviewers. Echenique gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF grants SES-1558757 and CNS-1518941. Yariv gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF grant SES-1629613. Prior to conducting the study, the authors obtained ethical approval from the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the California Institute of Technology.
1 Introduction

Affirmative-action policies have had a tumultuous history since their introduction over 50 years ago in the U.S. Intended to alleviate inequality in employment and pay, increase access to education, and promote diversity, they have been a subject of legal and political controversy. In their various forms, they are often set as a temporary “nudge”, put in place for a limited duration. For instance, in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled the use of race for affirmative action in school admissions as constitutional (Grutter v. Bollinger). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously stated that:

“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest [in student-body diversity] approved today.”

In this paper, we focus on statistical discrimination, where the source of unequal treatment is a correct statistical evaluation of past performance of different groups of individuals, rather than differential tastes. Our goal is to assess experimentally the efficacy of several affirmative-action policies for generating equal treatment while in place and, especially, after they are lifted.

Our results are threefold. The first is methodological: we are able to induce statistical discrimination in the laboratory, where workers from a disadvantaged group are discriminated against despite the absence of any exogenous differences between them. We consider affirmative-action policies that seek to reverse the induced discriminatory attitudes by rewarding firms for hiring disadvantaged workers. Rewards are of varying amounts and duration. Our second finding is that such policies, while in place, generally succeed in eliminating discrimination and lead to similar hiring rates of all workers. However, our third and arguably most important finding is that when affirmative-action policies are removed, statistical discrimination rears its head and returns to its original levels. Furthermore, our elicitation of

\footnote{The term “affirmative action” was introduced by President John F. Kennedy in an executive order in 1961 as a method for redressing discrimination that had persisted in spite of civil rights laws and constitutional guarantees. It was further developed and enforced under President Lyndon B. Johnson.}
beliefs suggests one mechanism for the behavior we observe—beliefs change slower than actions. The main message of the paper therefore implies more limited optimism than Justice O’Connor’s statement—while affirmative-action policies are effective tools for combating inequality while in place, their impact is short-lived. Once lifted, behavior reverts back to the unequal treatment that affirmative action was designed to undo.

Arrow (1998) argues that taste-based discrimination cannot explain unequal treatment of workers in the market since there would be arbitrage opportunities that would eventually drive out discriminating employers. Arrow concludes that statistical discrimination is the leading hypothesis for explaining the prevalence of discrimination in market settings. In reality, taste-based discrimination might still be present despite competitive pressures. This possibility makes field data particularly difficult to work with, as both types of discrimination could impact observed outcomes. The experimental lab allows us to isolate one channel.

Our experimental design is a particularly simple operationalization of the statistical discrimination model suggested by Kenneth Arrow (1971; 1973). In Arrow’s model, statistical discrimination is the manifestation of a coordination failure. Simplified, the game underlying Arrow’s analysis can be described as follows. Agents interact in worker-firm pairs. A worker may invest in a firm-specific skill, but this investment is worthwhile only if she is hired. For the firm, hiring a worker is desirable only if the worker has invested in acquiring the skill. However, workers and firms do not know each other’s choices when making their own. The resulting game has two Pareto-ranked pure equilibria. In one, the worker invests and the firm hires. In the other, the worker does not invest and the firm does not hire.

The game entails worker and firms simultaneously making decisions. This captures the idea of limited information for both parties: workers do not know whether they will be hired when deciding on their training investments and firms cannot perfectly observe investments. Indeed, there are many examples of human capital investments that are unobservable by

---

2 Arrow’s model assumes a perfectly symmetric situation and generates differences among groups endogenously. Phelps (1972) also proposes statistical discrimination as an explanation for observed discriminatory outcomes, but his explanation requires the existence of genuine exogenous differences between groups.
firms. Consider a student applying for a prestigious job from a "non-standard" background—having attended a low-ranked school, lacking a network of connections employers are linked to, etc. Even if a student invests greatly in her education, accomplishes high grades, and glowing recommendations, those indicators might be hard to read and assess for employers, see e.g. Karimi et al. (2018). The relevant reputations, of schools and of unfamiliar references, may take a long time to change.

In our experiments, workers are of two types: green and purple. Colors are a metaphor for group association, and substitute for observable characteristics of real-world workers (e.g., gender, race). Colors can serve as a coordination device, with different equilibria being followed when different types of workers are involved. Importantly, worker color is observable, both in our experiments and their real-world analogues. We term outcomes in which agents play different equilibria, depending on the color of the worker, as discriminatory.

In each of our sessions, experimental workers and firms are randomly matched, and play the game multiple times. All participants observe a moving average of historical play—worker investment levels and firm hiring rates—pertaining to both green and purple workers. The aggregate public history of play allows us to capture discriminatory path-dependent outcomes observed in the real world. It also provides a channel for hysteresis that allows us to induce discrimination in the lab.

Our sessions are comprised of four stages. First, our participants play a version of the game in which purple workers are less productive than green workers, i.e. have higher costs of investment. This first stage of the game "seeds" the discriminatory outcome.

In the second stage, we equalize the costs of investment across workers so that there are no material differences between the two worker groups. The history of play is enough to generate discriminatory outcomes: we find that participants coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium (no-investment and no-hiring) when the participating worker is purple. Indeed, in almost all sessions, firms hire purple workers at significantly lower rates than green workers, as they correctly anticipate that purple workers will invest at lower rates. Conversely, purple
workers invest less than green workers as they correctly anticipate that they will not be hired as often. These observations illustrate two points. First, our method of inducing discrimination is effective. Second, when we equalize conditions, discrimination remains. In particular, equalization in and of itself is insufficient to redress discrimination due to a historically unequal environment.

The third stage introduces affirmative action. Namely, firms are rewarded for hiring purple workers. We vary the magnitude of the reward and the duration of affirmative action across treatments. The academic world provides ample examples for these type of subsidies. While official records are difficult to attain, many universities reward departments for hiring minority candidates by allowing more faculty lines as a response; for an anecdotal description, see [Newman (2020)](#). Similarly, the public university systems in California, Florida, Georgia, and Texas have introduced legislation that allows top high-school students admission in the state’s colleges, with some funding from the state, see [Bleemer (2021)](#) and [Kapor (2020)](#). Admission to these colleges is desirable for the future employment opportunities it offers. Furthermore, to the extent that employers want to have a larger workforce, some quota policies share features with our subsidy treatments. For instance, suppose an employer needs to reach 50% representation of employees from a certain demographic. This means that, for every person hired from that demographic, the employer can hire another person. Naturally, not all quota policies fit our narrative. However, most affirmative-action policies share two common features: they induce employers to hire more minority employees and, in turn, provide prospective minority employees with greater promise of being hired. Our design captures the essential ingredients of many such policies.

Despite a salient public history of inefficient outcomes associated with purple workers, we now see firms more willing to hire purple workers. In turn, purple workers invest at greater rates. Across our treatments, while affirmative action is in place, discrimination essentially goes away.

Finally, in the last stage, we lift the affirmative-action policy. Thus, the last stage is
identical to the second stage, in which the environment is perfectly symmetric across worker types. In all our treatments, participants’ play reverts back to the discriminatory profile we observed in the second stage of our experiment: purple workers invest less often than green workers, and are hired less often. In other words, the effects of affirmative action are short-lived. One exception is the treatment in which affirmative action was imposed for a relatively long duration, for double the number of periods of each of the other stages. In that case, some improvement is seen even after the policy is lifted, but outcomes are still significantly different from those implied by an equal treatment of workers.

Figure 1 illustrates our main findings through our benchmark treatment, entailing a moderate affirmative-action subsidy for a duration that equals the duration of our other experimental stages. It shows investment and hiring rates for the different stages of our experiment, using green and purple colors to distinguish matches. The figure illustrates the findings described above: the baseline stage exhibits statistical discrimination; affirmative action largely equalizes hiring and investment rates between green and purple workers; and the removal of affirmative action sees participants reverting back to statistical discrimination.

In one of our treatments, the subsidy for hiring a purple worker is so high that it is a dominant strategy for firms to hire, and therefore a best response for purple workers to invest. This treatment exactly reverses the situation in the seed stage, where it is dominant.
for purple workers not to invest. Even in this treatment, where we mirror the incentives provided in the seed stage, affirmative action does not have lasting effects. We view this result as particularly telling. Naturally, it is difficult to say when an experimental affirmative-action policy comes close to capturing the mechanisms behind a real-world one. But a policy that is the exact mirror image of the “seed” conditions that induced discrimination to begin with seems like a natural candidate for undoing discrimination. We find, however, that discrimination persists.

Why are the effects of affirmative action so short-lived? The patterns of participants’ beliefs provide some insights. Throughout our experiments, we elicit workers’ beliefs regarding their probabilities of being hired, as well as firms’ beliefs regarding the probabilities that the workers they encounter had invested. In our experiments, firms’ decisions to hire purple workers are consistent with their reported beliefs about whether workers had invested. Affirmative-action policies change (temporarily) the decision to hire purple workers, but firms’ beliefs do not change significantly—beliefs are sticky. These beliefs do not change substantially when affirmative-action policies are introduced or removed. Their level is such that hiring is optimal when subsidies are present, but not when they vanish. As firms appear to be best responding to their beliefs and the incentives they face, this stickiness in firms’ expectations accounts for the quickly-fading impacts of affirmative action.

To summarize, with a growing desire to equalize the playing field across the market, our results suggest that affirmative-action policies should be thought through carefully. In their frequent forms, to be effective, they need to be both substantial in magnitude and long-lived.

2 Related Literature

Arrow (1998) argues that taste-based discrimination cannot explain unequal treatment of workers in the market since there would be arbitrage opportunities that would eventually drive out discriminating employers. Arrow concludes that statistical discrimination is the
leading hypothesis for explaining the prevalence of discrimination in market settings.

Statistical discrimination is consistent with a rich set of observations in the field. For instance, Ewens, Tomlin, and Wang (2014) identify statistical discrimination in the US rental market over race by analyzing renters’ responses to applications from white-sounding and African American-sounding names in various neighborhoods. Glover, Pallais, and Pariente (2017) consider interactions between managers and workers in grocery stores and find that more biased managers are associated with lower performance of minority workers, a pattern similar to that we induce in our seed stage.  

Coate and Loury (1993) provide a theoretical investigation of statistical discrimination and affirmative action. They raise the possibility that discrimination may persist after a period of affirmative action. Some of the basic ideas in their theoretical model are present in our design: interactions are bilateral, between workers and firms. Workers can invest, but an informative signal of their decision is available to the firms. Workers’ incentives to invest are, in fact, channeled through the informative signal: greater investment is associated with “better” signals, and higher likelihood of being hired. Our design, in contrast, is based on a pure coordination game. Workers want to invest even if they are guaranteed to be hired: in fact, workers’ incentives to invest are maximized then.

There are several studies that bring the Coate and Loury (1993) model to the lab. Anderson and Haupert (1999) and Fryer, Goeree, and Holt (2005) report on classroom experiments that capture the main forces of Coate and Loury (1993). The design of our seeding stage is inspired by these, with two important distinctions. First, we do not allow (explicit) random signals on workers’ investment decisions. Second, workers’ incentives to invest respond to whether they are hired or not.

Kidd, Carlin, and Pot (2008) seek to replicate some of the details in the Coate and Loury model. In particular, their design, unlike ours, relies on an informative signal of whether a
worker has invested, and much of the analysis tests the comparative-statics results of Coate and Loury (1993). In this setting, workers over-invest. The Kidd, Carlin, and Pot (2008) design is one-sided: experimental participants play the role of workers, while firms’ choices are computerized. In our study, firms’ choices are an important object for analysis, and their evolving beliefs, which we elicit, provide hints as to the source of the limited long-run efficacy of affirmative action we observe. Feltovich, Gangadharan, and Kidd (2013) use a similar design to that used by Kidd, Carlin, and Pot (2008), but focus on outcomes following the removal of an affirmative-action policy. They find that workers invest significantly more after affirmative action is removed than when it is in place. In their design, since the incentives to invest operate through their effects on the informative signal, workers who know they will be hired do not have strong incentives to invest. Thus, affirmative action suppresses investment. Our experiment has the opposite property, and we see that workers invest more when the affirmative-action policy is in place.

Outside of the Coate and Loury (1993) setting, various studies have looked at affirmative-action policies in the lab. For example, in the context of gender discrimination, Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund (2013) illustrate the effectiveness of affirmative-action policies in inducing women to compete. In contrast, Bracha, Cohen, and Conell-Price (2019) illustrate the potential harmful effects of affirmative action through its production of stereotype threat, whereby women are primed with negative stereotypes. Anderson, Fryer, and Holt (2006) present a survey of experiments in psychology and economics dealing with discrimination.

There is important work using field data that suggests potential shortcomings of affirmative action. Sander (2004) illustrates several negative impacts on African-American law students in the US. Sander and Taylor (2012) provide a comprehensive account of the impacts of affirmative-action policies on racial equality in US higher education. They suggest that even while in place, affirmative-action policies may have had detrimental effects on
minority students.

To conclude, we believe there are several features of our design whose combination is absent from most of the literature on affirmative action. First, we generate discrimination in the lab, rather than relying on participants’ existing prejudices that may vary in strength and difficult to control for. Second, we allow both workers and firms to act strategically and elicit all participants’ beliefs throughout the evolution of our experimental sessions. Beliefs are challenging to elicit in the field and provide insights into the mechanisms driving the successes and limitations of affirmative action. Last, we consider the impacts of affirmative action not only when it is in place, but also after it is lifted.

Methodologically, our technique for seeding discrimination relies on the presence of hysteresis—equilibrium selection at the start of the experiment affects selection later on. Outside the context of discrimination, Brandts and Cooper (2006) and Romero (2015) illustrate the presence of hysteresis in standard coordination games in which payoff parameters are changed over time.

3 Experimental Design

We start with a description of the game underlying our treatments. We then set forth a detailed description of our experimental protocol.

3.1 The Underlying Game

We consider statistical discrimination as a self-fulfilling equilibrium phenomenon. The model guiding our design is a stylized version of the model proposed by Arrow (1971): a worker can decide to undertake a costly investment in productivity, and a firm has to decide whether to hire the worker. The investment is only worthwhile to the worker if she is hired by the

\footnote{Krueger, Rothstein, and Turner (2006) assess empirically Justice O’Connor’s prediction that affirmative action would not be needed 25 years after the Grutter v. Bollinger ruling and find limited support for it.}

\footnote{See Appendix F in Arrow’s paper; see also Coate and Loury (1993).}
firm, but the worker has to make the decision to invest or not before knowing if she will be hired. The firm only wants to hire a worker if she has invested, but has to decide on hiring the worker without knowing the worker’s choice. In our setting, summarized in Table 1, for small enough investment costs $c$, there are two pure-strategy equilibria: (Invest, Hire) and (Not Invest, Not Hire).[^7] The former Pareto dominates the latter; there is therefore the possibility of *coordination failure*, whereby workers fail to invest because they correctly anticipate that they will not be hired.

Suppose there are two kinds of workers: GREEN workers and PURPLE workers—these categories can stand for different genders, races, etc. If worker color is observable, it is possible that firms will coordinate on (Invest, Hire) with, say, GREEN workers and on (Not Invest, Not Hire) with PURPLE workers. This situation corresponds to what we term statistical discrimination.

The particular flavor of statistical discrimination we are interested in, based on self-fulfilling expectations about hiring and investment, raises the question of how a society arrives at different hiring and investment rates for GREEN and PURPLE workers. The answer in our paper is *path dependence*. Our experiment starts with a “seed” stage, in which we make investment more costly for PURPLE workers. The seed stage may then affect beliefs in later, symmetric, rounds of play. Firms and PURPLE workers may coordinate on the Pareto dominated equilibrium because their beliefs are anchored in a history in which the outcome was (Not Invest, Not Hire).

[^7]: In principle, the presence of social preferences could alter players’ utilities such that Table 1 no longer induces a coordination game. However, for the values of $c$ used in the experiment, both equilibrium outcomes feature less inequality across players’ payoffs compared to the non-equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, the equilibria of Table 1 should be unaffected under standard models of social preferences.
The difference in investment costs at the seed stage is certainly a simplification, and is meant to capture a combination of possible real-world differences between people of different genders, races, and ethnicities. One possibility is that it captures literal differences in investment costs for members of disadvantaged and minority groups; for example, differences in the cost of schooling. The difference in investment cost may also reflect other difficulties in accessing the labor market, including those arising from preference-based discrimination—historical hiring rates may have been lower for some groups.

The numerical values in this game, which are proportional to the payoffs used in our experiment, are chosen to satisfy several constraints. First, the firm prefers to hire a worker if and only if the worker invests. Second, for high $c$, investing is strictly dominated. Third, for low $c$, there are two Pareto-ranked pure equilibria. Furthermore, there is a fixed cost of investment—say, the time required to acquire a skill that takes away from one’s earnings, regardless of the quality and intensity of the educational period. Thus, even when $c = 0$, a worker who is not hired is better off not investing (in our experiments, however, we set the minimal cost at $c = 200$, leading the worker to indifference when not hired). Fourth, if the firm receives a substantially high subsidy for hiring a worker of a particular type, which is the affirmative-action policy we consider, hiring the worker is dominant. Last, experimental payoffs need to be such that expected payoff differences across action profiles are meaningful and ultimate payoffs fall within those commonly paid in the experimental lab.

3.2 Overview of Treatments

For the purpose of describing the experiment, we define some standard terminology. Our experiment consists of two players playing a simultaneous-move game. Each play of the game is a round. Experimental participants play a number of rounds in a single one-hour

---

8One could certainly come up with other values that would satisfy these constraints and thereby capture identical ordinal incentives. Robustness to variations in payoffs that retain such ordinal comparisons is an interesting question more generally, but is outside the scope of this paper. Furthermore, we use a choice task that we hope appears fairly neutral to participants. One could also contemplate similar designs with real-effort tasks.
long sitting: each such sitting is a session. In a session, the same group of participants plays the game repeatedly, each participant being randomly and anonymously matched with other participants to play the two-player game. The different sessions vary in how we set the game parameters. A treatment is one specification of game parameters.

Our experiment is comprised of three treatments, where each treatment is run in several sessions. In all of our treatments, each session has four stages. Each stage consists of a fixed number of rounds. At the beginning of the session, participants are randomly assigned to the role of either a worker or a firm. Workers are also randomly assigned a color: GREEN or PURPLE. Both a participant’s role, a firm or a worker, and workers’ color are fixed across all session rounds.

Across treatments and stages, rounds follow a fixed protocol. In each round, workers and firms are randomly matched in pairs to play an investment/hiring game, shown in Table 1. Each worker decides whether to invest in costly training, where $c$ represents the cost of investment, which is common knowledge. Each firm, knowing the color of the worker she is paired with, decides whether to hire the worker. Both worker and firm make their decisions simultaneously, without observing each other’s decision. As we describe in the next subsection, the firm’s profit from hiring a worker can depend on the stage, the worker’s color, and the worker’s decision to invest or not. The determination of firms’ profits varies across our three treatments. In each round, workers and firms are also asked to report their beliefs about the other player’s decision. For instance, a worker is asked to report her belief about how likely it is that the firm chose to hire her. Similarly, a firm is asked to report her belief about how likely it is that the worker chose to invest in training. We use the binarized scoring rule of [Hossain and Okui (2013)] to incentivize belief elicitation. The binarized scoring rule is incentive compatible even for decision makers who are not risk neutral. Before making their decisions, all participants can observe a public history consisting of four moving averages: (1) GREEN workers’ average investment rate, (2) PURPLE workers’ average investment rate, (3) firms’ average hiring rate when paired with a GREEN worker, and (4) firms’ average
hiring rate when paired with a PURPLE worker. These averages are based on the decisions of all participants across all previous rounds of the session. For maximum clarity, these averages are reported graphically and numerically. At the end of each round, participants observe their own and their matched participant’s decisions and payoffs. All payoffs in the experiment are expressed in tokens, where 1 token = $0.01.

At the end of the experiment, participants complete two risk elicitation tasks and one survey questionnaire. Specifically, we use the risk elicitation task from Gneezy and Potters (1997). Each participant is given a token endowment and decides how many tokens to invest in a risky project with a known chance of success. We use duplicate elicitation tasks in order to account for measurement error, see Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019). The survey questionnaire contains basic demographic, academic, and lifestyle questions.

3.3 Stages of the Experiment

We now describe the four stages of each session.

Stage 1: Seed Stage

In the first stage of each session (Rounds 1 - 10), GREEN and PURPLE workers face different costs of investment. For a GREEN worker, the cost of investment is 200 tokens ($c = 200$ in Table 1). For a PURPLE worker, the cost of investment is 600 tokens ($c = 600$). These parameters generate two different games depending on the particular worker-firm matching. Notably, PURPLE workers have a dominant strategy of not investing. When a firm is paired with a PURPLE worker, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields (Not Invest, Not Hire) as the unique outcome; (Not Invest, Not Hire) is therefore the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. When a firm is paired with a GREEN worker, however, the strategic environment is a coordination game with two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (Invest, Hire)
and (Not Invest, Not Hire). The (Invest, Hire) equilibrium is Pareto-dominant. For each participant, playing their component of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a best response if the other participant is playing their component of the equilibrium with a probability of at least \( \frac{2}{3} \). Stage 1 serves to “seed” discrimination between GREEN and PURPLE workers.

**Stage 2: Baseline Stage**

In the second stage of each session (Rounds 11 - 20), investment costs are equalized. Both GREEN and PURPLE workers now face an investment cost of 200 tokens \((c = 200)\). Statistical discrimination occurs if participants coordinate on the Pareto-dominant (Invest, Hire) equilibrium when a firm plays against a GREEN worker, while participants coordinate on the Pareto-dominated (Not Invest, Not Hire) equilibrium when a firm plays against a PURPLE worker.\(^{11}\) The purpose of Stage 2 is twofold. The first is to test whether statistical discrimination emerges in the lab, once “seeded” by Stage 1. The second is to assess the extent to which it is alleviated over time, as the game with symmetric investment cost is played repeatedly.

**Stage 3: Introducing Affirmative Action**

In the third stage of each session, we maintain equal investment costs for both colors, but we implement an affirmative-action policy to incentivize the hiring of PURPLE workers. The policy takes the form of a subsidy \(s\) for any firm that chooses to hire a PURPLE worker, regardless of whether or not the worker invested in training. Our experimental treatments vary the size of the subsidy and the length of this stage.

*Subsidy:* For a period of 10 rounds (Rounds 21 - 30), each firm that hires a PURPLE worker earns an additional payment of 200 tokens \((s = 200)\). For a firm, hiring a

\(^{11}\)We focus here on the two pure-strategy equilibria, though in principle, we could consider discriminatory outcomes as ones in which GREEN and PURPLE workers engage in different equilibrium behavior more generally. As will be seen, individuals do not appear to play the mixed-strategy equilibrium in our data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subsidy</th>
<th>High Subsidy</th>
<th>Long Subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of Experiment</td>
<td>40 rounds</td>
<td>40 rounds</td>
<td>50 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Stage 3</td>
<td>10 rounds</td>
<td>10 rounds</td>
<td>20 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for Hiring GREEN (Stage 3)</td>
<td>$s = 0$</td>
<td>$s = 0$</td>
<td>20 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs for Hiring GREEN (Stage 3)</td>
<td>$p_{Invest} \geq \frac{2}{3}$</td>
<td>$p_{Invest} \geq \frac{2}{3}$</td>
<td>$p_{Invest} \geq \frac{2}{3}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy for Hiring PURPLE (Stage 3)</td>
<td>$s = 200$</td>
<td>$s = 900$</td>
<td>$s = 200$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs for Hiring PURPLE (Stage 3)</td>
<td>$p_{Invest} \geq \frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>$p_{Invest} \geq 0$</td>
<td>$p_{Invest} \geq \frac{1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Sessions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Participants</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: A summary of our experimental treatments.

PURPLE worker is now a best response if the worker is investing with a probability of at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

- **High Subsidy**: For a period of 10 rounds (Rounds 21 - 30), each firm that hires a PURPLE worker earns an additional payment of 900 tokens ($s = 900$). For a firm, hiring a PURPLE worker is now a dominant strategy. We note that by making the hiring of PURPLE workers a dominant strategy, the High Subsidy treatment is the mirror image of the seed stage.

- **Long Subsidy**: For a period of 20 rounds (Rounds 21 - 40), each firm that hires a PURPLE worker earns an additional payment of 200 tokens ($s = 200$). For a firm, hiring a PURPLE worker is now a best response if the worker is investing with a probability of at least $\frac{1}{2}$.

**Stage 4: Removing Affirmative Action**

In the fourth stage of each session (Subsidy and High Subsidy: Rounds 31 - 40, Long Subsidy: Rounds 41 - 50), the subsidy is removed. The parameters of Stage 4 are identical to those of Stage 2.
3.4 Implementation

All experimental sessions were run at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (ESSL) at UC Irvine. A total of 268 participants participated in 15 sessions. A summary of the treatments and corresponding sessions appears in Table 2. Each session lasted approximately one hour. Each participant’s earnings were the sum of a $7 show-up payment, their payoff from one randomly selected experimental round, and their payoff from one randomly selected risk-elicitation task. Average participant earnings were $24.46 (including the show-up payment). The experiment was programmed and conducted using the oTree software [Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016].

4 Hiring and Investment Decisions

We describe our results using the entire set of data. In the Online Appendix, we replicate the analysis using the last five rounds of each stage, in order to account for potential learning effects. The analysis using the last five rounds yields identical conclusions. We also show in the Online Appendix that responses of workers and firms to changing parameters are simultaneous and neither appears to precede the other.

Our data is structured as follows: we have multiple observations (one for each round, indexed by $t$) for each participant (indexed by $i$) who belongs in a particular session (indexed by $j$). For the core results of the paper, we assess statistical significance using multi-level random effects models. In particular, we estimate versions of the following model:

\[ \text{We use the multi-level random effects approach to deal with the problem of clustering standard errors. The appropriate level of clustering for the econometric analysis of experimental data is still an open question. Ibragimov and Müller (2016) develop a statistical test for the appropriate level of clustering, which they apply to experimental data from Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011). While they reject the null hypothesis of a fine level of clustering (at the participant level) against the alternative hypothesis of a coarse level of clustering (at the session level) in six out of seven cases, they also note that inference with so few clusters has the disadvantage of producing large variability in standard error estimates. Moffatt (2015), on the other hand, argues for explicitly recognizing the panel structure of the data and using a multi-level modeling approach whenever more than one level of clustering is appropriate. We adopt Moffatt (2015)'s recommendation.} \]
where $y_{ijt}$ is a dummy variable that measures the outcome variable of interest (i.e., investment or hiring), $x_{it}$ is a dummy variable for worker color, $u_i$ is a participant-specific error term, $v_j$ is a session-specific error term, and $\epsilon_{ijt}$ is a conventional error term. Tables 3 - 6 summarize our main results by presenting average investment/hiring rates as well as significance levels for the test of the null hypothesis that $\beta = 0$.

The multi-level random-effects model is a conservative approach to capturing the possible existence of unobserved dependencies between different observations in our data. The composition of participant pools across sessions may induce unobserved heterogeneity that can result in incorrect standard errors. Some participants in firm (worker) roles may systematically hire (invest) at higher rates than other participants, while some sessions may be characterized by higher levels of hiring and investment than other sessions. We conduct likelihood ratio tests to check for the presence of both between-participant and between-session variation in our data. In particular, we test the null hypothesis that there is neither between-participant nor between-session variation ($\sigma_u^2 = 0, \sigma_v^2 = 0$). Under the null hypothesis, the relevant test statistic has a $\chi^2(2)$ distribution since we are jointly testing two restrictions. We find strong evidence for the presence of both types of variation ($p < 0.10$ in all cases, $p < 0.05$ in all but one case). These results suggest that the multi-level random effects model is preferable to the linear regression model given our data’s structure.

For each stage, we consider 6 comparisons, pertaining to the investment and hiring of green relative to purple workers across our three treatments. As discussed above, the regressions utilized for these comparisons include only one explanatory variable. Nonetheless, an important caveat is that multiple hypotheses are reported simultaneously.

---

13 The standard specification we use does not account for interactions between participant and session effects—it presumes participant- and session-specific error terms are independent of one another. Our results should therefore be interpreted with appropriate caution.

14 As a benchmark, suppose each comparison was conclusive and determined fully at random, so that the coefficient on the worker’s color in the appropriate regression was strictly positive or strictly negative.
### Table 3: Investment/hiring decisions in the seed stage (unequal investment costs)

Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** $p < 0.01$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Investment GREEN</th>
<th>Investment PURPLE</th>
<th>Hiring GREEN</th>
<th>Hiring PURPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>$&gt;^\ast\ast\ast$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Subsidy</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>$&gt;^\ast\ast\ast$</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Subsidy</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>$&gt;^\ast\ast\ast$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.1 Inducing Statistical Discrimination

We first look at investment and hiring decisions in Stage 1, the seeding stage, when GREEN and PURPLE workers face different costs of investment. Table 3 shows average investment and hiring rates by worker color. Indeed, GREEN workers invest—and are hired—at significantly higher rates than PURPLE workers in all three treatments.

In Stage 2, the baseline stage, we equalize investment costs across workers. Table 4 shows average investment and hiring rates by worker color. Differences in investment and hiring across worker colors persist, though are less stark. In all cases but one, these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. These baseline differences in investment and hiring rates for workers of different colors reflect statistical discrimination.

We now look more closely at workers’ investment decisions in Stages 1 and 2. Recall that PURPLE workers have a dominant strategy of not investing in Stage 1 of the experiment. Pooling all three treatments, we find that 60% (40/67) of PURPLE workers consistently play their dominant strategy while 90% (60/67) of PURPLE workers deviate from their dominant strategy no more than twice over the 10 rounds of play. At the same time, 66% (44/67) of PURPLE workers never invest in Stage 1.

---

$15$ The sole exception is workers’ investment decisions in the Long Subsidy treatment, which follow the same pattern, but are not significantly different across colors at the 10% confidence level. As will be seen throughout, the responses of GREEN and PURPLE workers, as well as the firms facing them, differ at each stage, suggesting that our results are not an artifact of pure demand effects.

---

$15$ The sole exception is workers’ investment decisions in the Long Subsidy treatment, which follow the same pattern, but are not significantly different across colors at the 10% confidence level. As will be seen throughout, the responses of GREEN and PURPLE workers, as well as the firms facing them, differ at each stage, suggesting that our results are not an artifact of pure demand effects.
GREEN workers consistently invest in all Stage 1 rounds. When the investment costs are equalized in Stage 2, only 27% (18/67) of PURPLE workers invest in all rounds while 75% (50/67) of GREEN workers invest in all rounds. However, we also observe that few PURPLE workers continue to play their component of the Pareto-dominated equilibrium “seeded” in Stage 1: only 12% (8/67) of PURPLE workers consistently fail to invest in all Stage 2 rounds.

The empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of participant-level investment rates are shown in Figure 2 (panels a - f). Unsurprisingly, we observe sharp differences in Stage 1 behavior. In all cases except one, it is clear that the empirical distribution for GREEN workers first-order stochastically dominates the empirical distribution for PURPLE workers. In all cases except one, we can also reject the null hypothesis that the average investment rates for GREEN and PURPLE workers come from the same underlying theoretical distribution (assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yielding $p < 0.001$).

We conduct a similar exercise with respect to firms’ hiring decisions. The empirical CDFs of participant-level hiring rates are also shown in Figure 2 (panels g - l). Consistent with our observations pertaining to workers' behavior, the empirical distribution for hiring GREEN workers first-order stochastically dominates the empirical distribution for hiring PURPLE workers.

Table 4: Investment/hiring decisions in the baseline stage (equal investment costs)
Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** $p < 0.01$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Hiring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy</td>
<td>GREEN 0.86</td>
<td>PURPLE &gt;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.89 &gt;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Subsidy</td>
<td>GREEN 0.89</td>
<td>PURPLE &gt;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.90 &gt;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Subsidy</td>
<td>GREEN 0.83</td>
<td>PURPLE &gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83 &gt;***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

An independent observation corresponds to a worker’s average investment rate across all rounds of the stage.

As before, the sole exception is workers’ investment decisions in Stage 2 of the Long Subsidy treatment, where the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yields $p = 0.183$.

Since firms interact with both worker types in a given stage, we calculate a pair of observations for each firm: their average hiring rate when facing GREEN workers and their average hiring rate when facing PURPLE workers.
Figure 2: Empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior before affirmative action
PURPLE workers in all cases. We can also reject the null hypothesis that the average hiring rates for GREEN and PURPLE workers come from the same theoretical distribution (assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yielding \( p < 0.001 \) in all cases).

Our analysis throughout utilizes our full experimental data. Given that discriminatory behavior is less pronounced in the baseline stage of the Long Subsidy treatment, especially when considering workers’ behavior, it is natural to worry that some of our conclusions are driven by limited inducement of discrimination in that treatment. We note, however, that the focus of most of our analysis is on the effects of affirmative action and its removal relative to the baseline stage. In fact, even when we eliminate the three sessions exhibiting the least difference in hiring rates across GREEN and PURPLE workers in the baseline stage (one of which belongs to the High Subsidy treatment and two of which belong to the Long Subsidy treatment), the results reported here remain qualitatively unchanged.

Looking at aggregate investment and hiring rates in Stage 2 could lead to the conclusion that workers and firms are coordinating on the mixed-strategy equilibrium. However, Figure 2 casts doubt on this interpretation. In particular, at the individual level, both PURPLE workers and firms paired with them do not appear to be concentrating their strategies around those prescribed by the mixed-strategy equilibrium (i.e., invest and hire with \( \frac{2}{3} \) probability).

## 4.2 Introducing Affirmative Action

In Stage 3 of each experimental treatment, we introduce an affirmative-action policy in which each firm who hires a PURPLE worker is paid an additional subsidy. The size of the subsidy and its duration vary across our three treatments.

Table 5 shows average investment and hiring rates by worker color. Compared to the rates in Table 4, we see a notable decrease in discriminatory outcomes. In particular, there are no longer significant differences across worker color when it comes to workers’ investment decisions. That being said, the average investment rates of PURPLE workers still
Table 5: Investment/hiring decisions during affirmative action
Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Investment GREEN</th>
<th>Investment PURPLE</th>
<th>Hiring GREEN</th>
<th>Hiring PURPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy</td>
<td>0.76 &gt;</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.73 &gt;</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Subsidy</td>
<td>0.78 &gt;</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.72 &lt;</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Subsidy</td>
<td>0.74 &lt;**</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.69 &lt;***</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

lag behind those of GREEN workers in both the Subsidy and High Subsidy treatments (where affirmative action lasts only 10 rounds). In other words, PURPLE workers do not fully internalize firms’ responses to subsidies. It may seem odd that this occurs even in the High Subsidy treatment, when firms have a dominant strategy of hiring PURPLE workers and hire PURPLE workers at even greater rates than those pertaining to GREEN workers. However, investment by PURPLE workers in this treatment requires “second-order” rationality—PURPLE workers have to be rational and to also believe that firms are rational. The investment rate in our data (69%) is comparable to the estimate of second-order rationality (71%) found in Kneeland (2015).

The three affirmative-action policies we test are also effective in manipulating firms’ hiring behavior. In the Subsidy treatment (10 rounds, $s = 200$), firms no longer hire GREEN and PURPLE workers at significantly different rates. However, intensifying the affirmative-action policy by either increasing the size of the subsidy (from $s = 200$ to $s = 900$) or increasing the length of the subsidy (from 10 rounds to 20 rounds) causes firms to favor PURPLE workers in their hiring decisions. The impact of the subsidy increase is only modestly significant, while the impact of lengthening the subsidy is highly significant.

It is interesting to note that investment and hiring rates of PURPLE workers in the affirmative-action stage of the Long Subsidy treatment substantially exceed those observed in the Subsidy treatment, especially given that the first 10 rounds of the affirmative-action stage are identical in both treatments. This hints at an insight we will return to in Section 5.
Figure 3: Empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior during affirmative action
Knowing that the subsidy will remain in place for a long duration seems to affect behavior even in the initial rounds following the introduction of affirmative action.

The individual-level data further confirm that affirmative action is largely successful in reversing the previously-observed differences across worker colors. Figure 3 shows the empirical CDFs of participant-level investment and hiring rates while affirmative action is in place. For all treatments, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that GREEN and PURPLE workers’ average investment rates come from the same distribution. Furthermore, for all treatments, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average hiring rates of GREEN and PURPLE workers come from the same distribution.

### 4.3 Removing Affirmative Action

In Stage 4 of each treatment, we remove the affirmative-action subsidy. The parameters of this stage are then identical to those of our baseline stage, Stage 2. The purpose of this stage is to assess whether the benefits of affirmative action persist after the policy is lifted.

Table 6 depicts average investment and hiring rates by worker color. In terms of both investment and hiring decisions, we observe a surprising reversion to pre-affirmative action patterns of behavior. In all three treatments, GREEN workers invest at higher rates than

---

Table 6: Investment/hiring decisions after affirmative action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Investment GREEN</th>
<th>Investment PURPLE</th>
<th>Hiring GREEN</th>
<th>Hiring PURPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsidy</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>&gt;***</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>&gt;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Subsidy</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>&gt;**</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>&gt;***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Subsidy</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>&gt;*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels are indicated as follows: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we have the following p-values across treatments: Subsidy, $p = 0.146$; High Subsidy, $p = 0.057$; Long Subsidy, $p = 0.183$.

Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we have the following p-values across treatments: Subsidy, $p = 0.743$; High Subsidy, $p = 0.347$; Long Subsidy, $p = 0.187$.  

---
PURPLE workers. However, the duration of the affirmative-action policy seems to matter: these differences are statistically significant in the Subsidy and High Subsidy treatments but not in the Long Subsidy treatment.

Firms’ hiring decisions exhibit a similar pattern. In the Subsidy and High Subsidy treatments, firms hire GREEN workers at higher rates than PURPLE workers. Moreover, both of these differences are statistically significant. In fact, the shorter affirmative-action policies end up backfiring since the hiring rates of PURPLE workers are even lower in these two treatments than in the baseline stage.

With a longer period of affirmative action in the Long Subsidy treatment, we once again see that the deleterious effects of removing the subsidy are less severe. After the affirmative-action policy is lifted, firms’ hiring rates of GREEN and PURPLE workers appear closer and we fail to reject the null hypothesis that both worker types are hired at the same rate. Combined, this evidence suggests that a longer duration of affirmative action can have beneficial and lasting effects that extend beyond the life of the policy itself.

Figure 4 displays the empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior, both investment and hiring, after the affirmative-action policy is lifted. In all cases except one, the empirical distribution for GREEN workers first-order stochastically dominates the corresponding empirical distribution for PURPLE workers. This provides further evidence that discrimination in favor of GREEN workers persists in our experimental labor markets—even long after the explicit advantage of GREEN workers has been eliminated. With regard to investment decisions, we can reject the null hypothesis that GREEN and PURPLE workers’ average investment rates come from the same distribution in the Subsidy treatment, but not in the High Subsidy and Long Subsidy treatments. With regard to hiring decisions, we can reject the null hypothesis that firms’ average hiring rates for GREEN and PURPLE workers come

21The sole exception is firms’ hiring decisions in the Long Subsidy treatment.
22Specifically, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we get the following p-values across treatments: Subsidy, \( p = 0.004 \); High Subsidy, \( p = 0.129 \); Long Subsidy, \( p = 0.342 \).
Figure 4: Empirical CDFs of participant-level behaviour after affirmative action
from the same distribution in the Subsidy and High Subsidy treatments.\textsuperscript{23} These observations further testify that a longer duration of affirmative action can mitigate the reversal of the policy gains when the policy is eventually lifted.\textsuperscript{24}

We note that there is a striking asymmetry between the effects of the seeding and affirmative action stages. Seeding creates a long-lasting difference in how GREEN and PURPLE workers behave, and how firms treat them. The affirmative-action policy is similar in that it modifies firms’ payoffs in order to undo statistical discrimination by favoring the hiring of PURPLE workers. However, this policy is nowhere close to being as effective as the initial seeding. This observation is particularly interesting with respect to our High Subsidy treatment, which effectively mirrors the seeding stage—it lasts for an identical period of time and involves a dominant strategy for firms of hiring PURPLE workers. Nonetheless, when the High Subsidy affirmative-action policy is lifted, discriminatory outcomes reappear.

5 Beliefs as a Channel for Persistence

So far, we focused on the binary outcomes of our experimental interactions (invest or not for workers; hire or not for firms). We now investigate the evolution of participants’ beliefs throughout our experiment. As we will see, beliefs are sticky: while agents respond to the pecuniary incentives that subsidies introduce, their beliefs are not altered dramatically.

We first inspect the linkages between beliefs and actions. We consider the question of whether participants are playing best-response strategies, both with respect to their reported beliefs and with respect to the public history of play. Table \ref{table:best-response} shows the breakdown of best-response rates by participant role/color, treatment, and stage. As can be seen, participants’ actions are largely optimal given their reported beliefs. In aggregate, 85% (7,534/8,880)

\textsuperscript{23}Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test\textsuperscript{,} we get the following p-values across treatments: Subsidy, $p = 0.001$; High Subsidy, $p = 0.005$; Long Subsidy, $p = 0.793$.

\textsuperscript{24}While we focus on statistical discrimination alone, we suspect that the presence of taste-based discrimination in environments such as ours would only exacerbate the outcomes we report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seed Stage</th>
<th>Baseline Stage</th>
<th>Introducing Affirmative Action</th>
<th>Removing Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidy</td>
<td>High Subsidy</td>
<td>Long Subsidy</td>
<td>Subsidy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN workers</td>
<td>0.85/0.84</td>
<td>0.71/0.85</td>
<td>0.78/0.81</td>
<td>0.87/0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURPLE workers</td>
<td>0.93/0.93</td>
<td>0.86/0.86</td>
<td>0.95/0.95</td>
<td>0.85/0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms paired with GREEN</td>
<td>0.80/0.80</td>
<td>0.78/0.79</td>
<td>0.74/0.78</td>
<td>0.85/0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms paired with PURPLE</td>
<td>0.90/0.86</td>
<td>0.85/0.83</td>
<td>0.90/0.90</td>
<td>0.80/0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86/0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.83/0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.69/0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.87/0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.78/0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.84/0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86/0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.86/0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.85/0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.80/0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Fraction of best-responses to reported beliefs/public histories
of participants’ actions are a best response to their reported beliefs.\footnote{This level is consistent, if somewhat higher, than other reported statistics of best responses, see e.g. \textcite{Rey-Biel2009} and references therein.} Participants best respond to the public history at far lower rates, standing at 73% (6,483/8,880). This is reasonable—since the public history includes the results from all previous rounds and does not reset between stages, less sensitivity to the public history implies sensitivity to the changing parameters/incentives of the experiment.

One might wonder whether participants “develop” taste-based discrimination throughout our experiment. The patterns of best-responses suggest they do not. Indeed, firms that best respond to their beliefs hire GREEN workers at significantly greater rates than PURPLE workers. However, firms that do not best respond to their beliefs, whom one might suspect to have developed discriminatory attitudes that go beyond the statistical, actually hire PURPLE workers at comparable or higher rates (albeit, insignificantly so). Furthermore, firms’ beliefs regarding their paired workers’ investment \textit{conditional} on hiring are less optimistic for PURPLE workers. That is, firms do not appear to require a higher threshold of belief for PURPLE workers.

While participants’ actions are consistent with their beliefs, actions are far coarser. The evolution of beliefs throughout our sessions thus provides insight into the action choices we observe. Figure \ref{fig:worker-beliefs} illustrates workers’ average beliefs across rounds and Figure \ref{fig:firm-beliefs} illustrates firms’ average beliefs across rounds, along with the average public history that was visible to participants on the experimental interface.

Reported beliefs reflect general trends of the public history, but differ in magnitudes and slopes. In many cases, they are not co-monotonic. Relative to the public history, beliefs are slightly less optimistic for GREEN workers and substantially more optimistic for PURPLE workers. In particular, participants do not simply mirror the public history when reporting beliefs.

Importantly, while we see a jump in beliefs pertaining to PURPLE workers’ investment
Figure 5: Workers’ beliefs and firm hiring history (solid black lines illustrate threshold beliefs for investment to be optimal)
Figure 6: Firms’ beliefs and worker investment history (solid black lines illustrate threshold beliefs for hiring to be optimal)
after the seeding stage, beliefs remain fairly flat afterwards, with only slight increases during the affirmative-action phase, which flattens out during the affirmative-action phase of our Long Subsidy treatment. The level of beliefs is such that, absent subsidies, the decision to hire is only marginally optimal in some cases, whereas it is clearly optimal when affirmative-action incentives are in place.\footnote{This could be an indication that participants are simply coordinating on the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game in the baseline and final stages, which would be consistent with the reported beliefs. At the individual level, however, behavior in these stages is inconsistent with that equilibrium (see Section 4.1).}

In contrast, beliefs regarding GREEN workers are slightly below those suggested by their actual investment rates. Naturally, one needs to take with care any impression that beliefs are pessimistic. Indeed, experimental investment rates by GREEN workers are rather high. Therefore, any perturbations of those statistical rates that generate beliefs would generally shift average assessments down. Regardless, beliefs are sufficiently high as to guarantee hiring throughout the different experimental stages.

In the Online Appendix, we also show that participants generally hold well-calibrated beliefs, tracking rather closely observed behavior. Nonetheless, in line with our description above, when focusing on PURPLE workers and the firms they are paired with, we see excessive optimism in the first, seeding stage. Firms and workers are overly pessimistic when affirmative action is introduced, and then overly optimistic when it is lifted.

Finally, we note that affirmative action can work through two distinct channels in our experiment. First, affirmative action can directly manipulate firms’ underlying beliefs about the productivity of PURPLE workers. Second, even if firms’ beliefs are unchanged, firms can still respond positively to the pecuniary incentive associated with affirmative action. To decompose these two effects, we conduct a counterfactual exercise where we investigate firms’ optimal hiring decisions given their beliefs while the policy is in place but in the absence of the subsidy. When affirmative action lasts for only 10 rounds, we find that firms would hire PURPLE workers in less than half of their interactions: 42\% (92/220) in the Subsidy treatment and 47\% (98/210) in the High Subsidy treatment. In the Long Subsidy treatment,
however, firms would hire PURPLE workers in 67% (320/480) of their interactions. This underscores our earlier points about the stickiness of firms’ beliefs and the limited efficacy of a short duration of affirmative action. Given that firms’ beliefs are not responding sufficiently in two of our three treatments to sustain hiring in the absence of a subsidy, it should come as no surprise that discrimination reappears when the subsidy is lifted.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy first utilized the term affirmative action in its contemporary sense in Executive Order 10925. The intention was to have government contractors “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” Today, affirmative action refers to the leading set of laws, policies, guidelines, and administrative practices aimed at alleviating racial and gender-based discrimination. Our goal in this paper is to use an array of lab experiments to assess the effects of affirmative-action policies in combating statistical discrimination, while in place and after they are lifted.

Our results raise questions about the long-term effectiveness of affirmative-action policies. To level the playing field, our findings suggest that affirmative-action policies need to be activated for substantial periods of time. These implications relate to the empirical regularity that affirmative-action policies tend to become entrenched, and left in place far longer than initially intended, see Sowell (2004).

Any conclusion about the long-term effects of affirmative action should be qualified. We have focused on affirmative action as an instrument for correcting statistical discrimination in labor markets, but there are other sources of discrimination, and other environments in which discrimination occurs. For instance, it is quite possible that exposing people to the rich diversity of humankind may change their beliefs through various channels—role models, exemplars, etc.—and thereby address taste-based discrimination.27 Even in our context, 27For instance, Miller (2017) illustrates some positive effects of temporary affirmative-action policies that

33
it might be that first-hand experience with minority employees who have invested in their human capital would help change otherwise sticky beliefs. There is also a fairness argument in favor of affirmative action—it serves as compensation for past discrimination. Affirmative action in education does not only seek to change expectations, its objective includes granting access to minority students who would not otherwise be able to attend good schools or to obtain higher education (see the landmark study of Bowen and Bok (2016) for an elaborate discussion of affirmative action in education). There are also possible dynamic benefits from affirmative action. Even if affirmative action does not eliminate discrimination today, it may help future generations of minorities access better opportunities. As in our experiments, the fruits of affirmative action might simply take a long time to ripen.
References


